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No. 11-11021
State of Florida v. United States Department of
Health and Human Services, et al.
Pursuant to 11th Circuit Rule 26.1-1, the undersigned
counsel certifies that, to the best of his knowledge, the
persons, firms and associations listed on the Certificate of
Interested Persons filed by the appellant, the United States
Department of Health and Human Services (the “United States”),
and set forth at pages C-1 through C-25 of the United States’
opening brief, are complete and accurate, and are incorporated
by reference herein.

In addition, the undersigned lists the

following as persons that may have an interest in the outcome of
this case:
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts
The Hon. Deval L. Patrick, Governor of Massachusetts
Martha Coakley, Attorney General, Commonwealth of
Massachusetts

/s/ John M. Stephan
John M. Stephan
Assistant Atty. General
Date:

April 8, 2011
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INTEREST OF THE AMICUS
In the spring of 2006, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
passed and implemented An Act Providing Access to Affordable,
Quality, Accountable Health Care, Chapter 58 of the Acts of 2006
(“Chapter 58”), thereby becoming the first State in the Nation
to enact healthcare reform that requires all non-exempt
individuals to purchase some form of health insurance coverage.
Chapter 58’s core features include, among other things, a stateoperated health insurance exchange, new subsidies for low- and
moderate-income individuals, and a mandate that all individuals
who can afford health insurance purchase coverage.

Chapter 58

has been widely cited as a model used by Congress in fashioning
what became the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the
“ACA”).

With four years of empirical data collected since

Chapter 58 went into effect, Massachusetts is uniquely situated
to speak to the actual economic effects of comprehensive reform
that includes an individual coverage requirement.
The experience of Massachusetts under Chapter 58 confirms a
key Congressional assumption underlying the ACA:

that by

requiring individuals to be insured, and thereby preventing
healthy people from foregoing health insurance until they are
sick or injured (a practice commonly derided as “free-riding”),
a comprehensive reform program can spread risk, control costs,
and reduce the financial burdens otherwise borne by health plans
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Massachusetts submits this amicus brief in

support of the ACA because its experience demonstrates that
Congress had a rational basis for concluding that free-riding by
individuals, taken in aggregate, has a substantial effect upon
interstate commerce, and that reducing or eliminating freeriding has a salutary impact on the health insurance market as a
whole.
In July of 2005, then Governor Mitt Romney filed House Bill
4279, and in his filing letter to the Massachusetts Legislature
he stated:
Today, we spend approximately $1 billion on the
medical cost for the uninsured. Safety Net Care
redirects this spending to achieve better health
outcomes in a more cost-effective manner. With Safety
Net Care in place, it is fair to ask all residents to
purchase health insurance or have the means to pay for
their own care. This personal responsibility
principle means that individuals should not expect
society to pay for their medical costs if they forego
affordable health insurance options.1
Governor Romney’s proposed legislation to enact “Safety Net
Care” was the precursor to Chapter 58, which he signed on April
12, 2006.2

1

Letter from Governor Mitt Romney to the Massachusetts
Legislature dated July 20, 2005, filing proposed health reform
entitled, An Act to Increase the Availability and Affordability
of Private Health Insurance To Residents of the Commonwealth.
H.B. 4279, 184th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2005)
2

Under Governor Romney’s proposed legislation, “Safety Net Care”
was the term used for a proposed government subsidized premium
(footnote continued)
2
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The Massachusetts healthcare reform law has yielded
positive economic consequences.

Three years after its

enactment, Massachusetts had reduced the number of uninsured
residents to less than three percent of the state’s population
and increased the number of residents with health insurance by
more than 432,000, giving Massachusetts the lowest percentage of
uninsured residents in the Nation.3

By the fall of 2009, more

than 95 percent of nonelderly Massachusetts adults were insured,
up from 87.5 percent in the fall of 2006.4

The significant gains

in the number of Massachusetts residents with health insurance
helped spur a corresponding sharp decline in the amount of state
spending on "free care" for the uninsured and under-insured.

(footnote continued)
assistance offered to low-income individuals who were not
eligible for Medicaid. H.B. 4279, 184th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2005).
3

See Mass. Taxpayers Found., Massachusetts Health Reform: The
Myth of Uncontrolled Costs 2 (May 2009), available at
http://www.masstaxpayers.org/sites/masstaxpayers.org/files/Healt
h%20care-NT.pdf [hereinafter Mass. Taxpayers Found.].
4

See Blue Cross Blue Shield Found., Health Reform in
Massachusetts: An Update as of Fall 2009 iv (June 2010),
available at
http://bluecrossfoundation.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Policy
%20Publications/060810MHRS2009FINAL.pdf [hereinafter BCBS Found.
Report]. Indeed, insurance coverage rose by 14.1 percentage
points for lower-income adults and 6.6 percentage points for
adults with a chronic health condition between fall 2006 and
fall 2009. Id. at v.

3
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The amount of free care dropped from $709.5 million in fiscal
year 2006 to $414 million in fiscal year 2009.5
Despite these successes under Chapter 58, however,
Massachusetts, like any individual state, is unable to grapple
effectively with the interstate (and international) economic
implications of current healthcare trends.

While Massachusetts

plays the primary role in protecting the health and welfare of
Massachusetts residents, the state shares responsibility for
regulating healthcare and health insurance with the federal
government.

Through Medicare, Medicaid, and a variety of

federal statutes, notably the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the federal government plays a
substantial (and, in some areas, exclusive) role in shaping the
nationwide healthcare marketplace.

Given this overlay, some

aspects of healthcare reform are beyond individual states’
regulatory reach.

For example, Massachusetts’s ability to

regulate the private group health plan market in Massachusetts
is constrained by ERISA, which preempts state governments from
enacting laws that regulate self-insured employer health benefit
plans, the most common source of health coverage for American
workers.
5

See Division of Health Care Finance and Policy, 2009 Annual
Report: Health Safety Net 4 (Dec. 2009); Division of Health Care
Finance and Policy, Uncompensated Care Pool PFY06 Annual Report
3 (July 2007).
4
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Accordingly, Massachusetts supports the ACA as an
appropriate federal response to the urgent need for
comprehensive, national healthcare reform.

The ACA carefully

balances federal economic interests with the states’ interest in
developing new ways to control costs while improving access to
quality healthcare.
ARGUMENT
A.

THE EXPERIENCE OF MASSACHUSETTS CONFIRMS THAT CONGRESS
HAD A RATIONAL BASIS TO DETERMINE THAT FREE-RIDING,
TAKEN IN AGGREGATE, SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECTS INTERSTATE
COMMERCE; ACCORDINGLY, CONGRESS HAD AUTHORITY UNDER
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE TO IMPOSE THE MINIMUM COVERAGE
REQUIREMENT.

The Commerce Clause provided Congress with authority to
enact the ACA, including the minimum coverage requirement.

The

Constitution gives Congress the power to “regulate Commerce
. . . among the several States.”
3.

U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl.

Under this authority, Congress can “regulate activities that

substantially affect interstate commerce.”6

Gonzales v. Raich,

545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005).
As “stressed” by the Supreme Court, “[i]n assessing the
scope of Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause . . . the
task before [the Court] is a modest one.”

6

Id. at 22.

The Court

Congress also has the authority to “regulate the channels of
interstate commerce” and to “regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce and persons or things
in interstate commerce.” Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 16-17.
5

Case: 11-11021

Date Filed: 04/11/2011

Page: 12 of 25

“need not determine” itself whether the regulated “activities,
taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce
in fact, but only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so
concluding.”

Id.

There is a rational basis for concluding that, taken in the
aggregate, individuals’ refusal to obtain health insurance
substantially affects interstate commerce.

“[T]he business of

insurance” is within “the regulatory power of Congress under the
Commerce Clause.”

United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters

Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944).

In the ACA, Congress found

that:
The cost of providing uncompensated care to the uninsured
was $43,000,000,000 in 2008. To pay for this cost, health
care providers pass on the cost to private insurers, which
pass on the cost to families. This cost-shifting increases
family premiums by on average over $1,000 a year. By
significantly reducing the number of the uninsured, the
requirement, together with the other provisions of this
Act, will lower health insurance premiums.
ACA § 1501(a)(2)(F), as amended by § 10106.7

“It is well

established by decisions of [the Supreme] Court that the power
to regulate commerce includes the power to regulate the prices
at which commodities in that commerce are dealt in and practices
affecting such prices.”

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128

7

Such Congressional findings are to be considered in the
analysis when available, although they are not necessary to
sustain the exercise of Commerce Clause authority. Gonzales,
545 U.S. at 21.

6
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(1942) (upholding, as a proper subject of Congressional action
under the Commerce Clause, a regulation penalizing production of
wheat in excess of federal quota, even where applied to wheat
grown not for market, but for consumption at home).

Because it

directly impacts the prices at which health insurance policies
will be sold, individuals’ refusal to obtain health insurance is
a practice properly subject to regulation by Congress under the
Commerce Clause.8
The experience in Massachusetts elevates the connection
between eliminating free-riders and controlling costs from a
rational belief to a demonstrable correlation.

Governor Romney

and the Massachusetts Legislature, like Congress, determined
that an individual health insurance mandate, as part of a
comprehensive reform package, would serve to increase access to
healthcare while greatly decreasing the detrimental costshifting caused by people who chose to forego insurance and
shift the cost of their current and future healthcare to others.9
As discussed above, in the three years after Chapter 58’s
8

As in Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 25-26, the earlier Supreme Court
decisions in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), are
distinguishable as they relate to non-economic behavior.
9

Federal law, in fact, requires Medicare-participating hospitals
with an emergency department to provide emergency services to
stabilize patients with emergency medical conditions regardless
of whether they are insured. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006).

7
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enactment, there was, indeed, a significant increase in the
percentage of insured Massachusetts residents.10

The significant

gains in the number of Massachusetts residents with health
insurance helped spur a corresponding sharp decline in the
amount of spending on "free care" for the uninsured and underinsured:

The amount of free care dropped 40 percent -- hundreds

of millions of dollars -- from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year
2009.11
The Massachusetts reform program also has improved
healthcare use.

From the fall of 2006 to the fall of 2009, more

adults (including lower-income adults, adults with chronic
health conditions and minority adults) reported visits to
doctors and fewer adults reported unmet need for care.12
Massachusetts achieved these gains in access to care while
making gains in the affordability of care for its residents.

In

the fall of 2009, as compared with the fall of 2006, and
notwithstanding the systemic impacts of the economic recession,
there were reductions in both the share of adults reporting high
10

See Mass. Taxpayers Found., supra note 3; BCBS Found. Report,
supra note 4, at 10.
11

See Division of Health Care Finance and Policy, 2009 Annual
Report: Health Safety Net 4 (Dec. 2009); Division of Health Care
Finance and Policy, Uncompensated Care Pool PFY06 Annual Report
3 (July 2007).
12

BCBS Found. Report, supra note 4, at 10.

8
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out-of-pocket healthcare spending relative to family income and
the share of adults reporting unmet needs for care due to cost.13
Moreover, nearly 200,000 of the state’s newly insured residents
were enrolled in private plans that do not receive government
subsidies, evidence that the more generous public programs
created under Chapter 58 are not supplanting the state’s
existing health insurance providers.14

Analysis from 2009 also

demonstrates that the state’s individual health insurance
requirement is encouraging people who were previously eligible
for employer-based insurance, but did not previously accept it,
to enroll in a private plan.15
As the experience with healthcare reform in Massachusetts
shows, prohibiting people from opting out of the insurance
market when they can afford coverage, and creating incentives
for these “free-riders” to join their employer-sponsored health
plan or to enroll in a publicly supported healthcare plan, has
helped generate “increases in both public and private insurance

13

BCBS Found. Report, supra note 4, at 10.

14

See Josh Goodman, Massachusetts: A Model, or Cautionary Tale?,
Wash. Health Pol’y Wk. in Rev. (The Commonwealth Fund), June 8,
2009, available at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/Newsletters/WashingtonHealth-Policy-in-Review/2009/Jun/June-8-2009/Massachusetts-AModel-or-Cautionary-Tale.aspx.
15

Id.

9
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coverage, and this increase in coverage has translated into
increases in the access, use, affordability, and quality of care
in the state.”16
B.

BECAUSE ELIMINATING FREE-RIDERS IS, AT A MINIMUM,
RATIONALLY RELATED TO SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF
OTHER COMPONENTS OF FEDERAL HEALTHCARE LAW, CONGRESS
ALSO HAD AUTHORITY UNDER THE NECESSARY AND PROPER
CLAUSE TO IMPOSE THE MINIMUM COVERAGE REQUIREMENT.

The Necessary and Proper Clause provided Congress with
additional authority to set the minimum coverage requirement as
a means to effectuate the broader ends of the ACA.

The

Constitution gives Congress the power to “make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper in carrying into Execution” its
powers, including those under the Commerce Clause.

U.S. Const.,

art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
As with the analysis under the Commerce Clause, the
standard for determining whether legislation is authorized under
the Necessary and Proper Clause is a relaxed one.

Enactment of

a particular federal law is authorized by the Necessary and
Proper Clause when “the statute constitutes a means that is
rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally
enumerated power.”

United States v. Comstock, ___ U.S. ___, 130

S.Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010).

In Comstock, the Court reiterated its

nearly 200-year-old formulation on this issue, originally

16

BCBS Found. Report, supra note 4, at 50.
10
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expressed by Chief Justice Marshall, that the Necessary and
Proper Clause is a “broad power to enact laws that are
‘convenient, or useful’ or ‘conducive’ to the . . . ‘beneficial
exercise’” of specifically granted powers.

130 S.Ct. at 1956

(quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 413, 418 (1819)).
Thus, even if Congress lacked authority under the Commerce
Clause to impose the minimum coverage requirement -– which it
did not; see Argument A, supra –- it was authorized by the
Necessary and Proper Clause to impose it as a rational requisite
of implementing other components of federal law that were
unequivocally permitted by the Commerce Clause.

Congress made

particular findings that make clear the rational relationship
between the minimum coverage requirement and Congress’s exercise
of its Commerce Clause powers in other related legislation.
First, Congress found that:
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.), the Public Health Service Act (42
U.S.C. 201 et seq.), and [the ACA], the Federal Government
has a significant role in regulating health insurance. The
requirement is an essential part of this larger regulation
of economic activity, and the absence of the requirement
would undercut Federal regulation of the health insurance
market.
ACA § 1501(a)(2)(H), as amended by § 10106.
Second, Congress, in § 1201 of the ACA, makes changes to
the Public Health Service Act that ban pre-existing condition

11
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exclusions and discrimination in health insurance based on
health status.

Congress found that:

Under sections 2704 and 2705 of the Public Health Service
Act (as added by section 1201 of this Act), if there were
no requirement, many individuals would wait to purchase
health insurance until they needed care. By significantly
increasing health insurance coverage, the [minimum
coverage] requirement, together with the other provisions
of this Act, will minimize this adverse selection and
broaden the health insurance risk pool to include healthy
individuals, which will lower health insurance premiums.
The requirement is essential to creating effective health
insurance markets in which improved health insurance
products that are guaranteed issue and do not exclude
coverage of preexisting conditions can be sold.
ACA § 1501(a)(2)(I), as amended by § 10106.
Massachusetts’s experience gives additional support to the
conclusion that the minimum coverage requirement was, at a
minimum, rationally related to the implementation of Congress’s
unquestioned authority under the Commerce Clause to alter other
aspects of the federal healthcare regulatory landscape.
Specifically, as discussed above, Massachusetts utilized just
such a provision as a linchpin of its comprehensive reform and
has reaped intrastate benefits through sharp reductions in
spending on “free care” for uninsured residents and improved
access to healthcare.
There remains a limit, however, to the structural changes
Massachusetts can effect in the healthcare marketplace, given
the constraints resulting from state jurisdictional limits and
imposed by long-established federal law.
12

Healthcare access and
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affordability significantly affect interstate activity,
including where people choose to reside and how they obtain
coverage and treatment.

During fiscal year 2009 alone, for

example, Massachusetts hospitals provided inpatient care to more
than 43,000 patients who were not residents of Massachusetts, at
an estimated cost of $910,000,000.17

Of these non-Massachusetts

residents, approximately 1,200 did not have any health
insurance.18

The number of out-of-state patients without

insurance coverage was even greater at Massachusetts emergency
departments where more than 12,900 uninsured individuals
received care during fiscal year 2009.19

Massachusetts cannot

regulate insurance coverage for non-Massachusetts residents, nor
can it (or should it) restrict access to necessary and emergent
care.

This interstate flow of patients (including uninsured

patients) is but one illustration that individual states cannot
effectively account for, let alone mitigate, the impact of
healthcare trends felt on the national and interstate levels.
Congress has long recognized that employer health plans had
“operational scope and economic impact” that was “increasingly

17

Division of Health Care Finance and Policy, Hospital Discharge
Database (HDD) for fiscal year 2009 (October 1, 2008 through
September 30, 2009).
18
19

Id.
Id.

13
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The federal government already exercises

significant control over a large section of the private group
health plan market.

In Massachusetts, more than half of this

market is made up of self-insured plans that, because of ERISA’s
preemptive effect, are beyond the direct reach of state
regulators.21

Nationwide, the number of people enrolled in these

self-insured employer plans has increased markedly since 1999.
In 2007, 55 percent of the 132.8 million people in plans
governed by ERISA were in self-insured plans, up from 44 percent
in 1999.22

The federal government has long exercised exclusive

regulatory authority over these self-insured employer benefit
plans.

The continued growth of self-insured plans, coupled with

the interstate nature of the healthcare marketplace,
demonstrates the need for the federal reforms contained in the
ACA to establish minimum national standards for health coverage.
The ACA specifically provides that individual states remain free
20

ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2.

21

The “private group market” includes large group, small group,
and self insured members. See Division of Health Care Finance
and Policy, Health Care in Massachusetts: Key Indicators, 4, 6
(Nov. 2010), available at
http://www.mass.gov/Eeohhs2/docs/dhcfp/r/pubs/10/key_indicators_
november_2010.pdf.
22

See William Pierron & Paul Fronstin, ERISA Pre-emption:
Implications for Health Reform and Coverage 314 EBRI Issue Brief
11 (Feb. 2008), available at
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_02a-20082.pdf.

14

Case: 11-11021

Date Filed: 04/11/2011

Page: 21 of 25

to further regulate intrastate aspects of the health insurance
market, including reforms similar to those implemented in
Massachusetts under Chapter 58, if they so choose.
The success of Massachusetts healthcare reform demonstrates
the economic benefits of tackling the free-rider problem headon, through comprehensive reform including a requirement that
individuals who can afford health insurance must purchase it.
The experience of Massachusetts shows that the minimum coverage
requirement in the ACA was, at least, rationally related to
Congress’s effort pursuant to the Commerce Clause to address the
interstate implications of healthcare access and affordability.

15
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CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Massachusetts urges this Court to hold
that Congress had the constitutional authority to enact the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
Respectfully submitted,
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,
by and through its
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
MARTHA COAKLEY

/s/ John M. Stephan
Thomas M. O’Brien
Daniel J. Hammond
John M. Stephan
Assistant Attorneys General
One Ashburton Place
Boston, Massachusetts 02108
(617) 727-2200
ext. 2455 (O’Brien)
ext. 2078 (Hammond)
ext. 2959 (Stephan)

April 8, 2011
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